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NEW CRISIS IN INDOCHINA 
~r. ,.,resident: In the last few days there have been very diaturb· 
ing reports on the situation in south VietNam. For a time, the nationalist 
government in Saigon appeared to be making some progrea 1 in consolidating 
the non-communist poaition. Headed by Ngo Dien Diem, that government 
had the full cooperation of the United States and the policies of the Mendes -
France cabinet in Paris were not unfavorable to ita stability and progress. 
The Diem government made clear from the outset that it was 
' 
dedicated to the independence and welfare of the people of Viet Nam. 
Because it was, it antagonized powerful forces, native and otherwile, 
in Saigon. Most of all it antagonized the Ho Chi-Minh forces in the north. 
For the first time they found themselves confronted with an opposition 
which had some chance of capturing the loyalties of the Viet Narnese 
people which they had monopolized by default prior to its advent. 
Now the picture has changed. Press reports tell of deterioration 
and loss of confidence once again in Saigon. The opposition to Diem which 
has n~ver ceased in underground conspiracy and sabotage to attempt to 
overthrow him baa now come out in an open military action designed to 
destroy his government. There has already been considerable fighting and 
bloodshed in the streets of Saigon. 
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Ae members of the Senate may recall, I have viaited Viet Nam 
during the course of two study mbeions in Indochina and have reported 
my observation• to the Committee on Foreign Relatione. I have also 
apoken on the situation in Indochina from time to time in thil body. 
I have not been in Viet Narn eince laet September, and I do not 
know the full detaile of the preeent crisis. I assume that the President 
and the Secretary of State do have those detail• since they bear 
reeponeibility for formulating and executing our policy with respect to 
VietNam. 
Recent news report• from Saigon a.nd elsewhere, however. do 
give a general picture of what has been going on in south VietNam. They 
tell of French diseatt.faction with the Diem government and the bitter 
animosity of various sects and other groups towards that government 
becauae of its attempte to curt.ail their independent power and revenue. 
The Diem government ie portrayed ae on the verge of overthrow, with its 
P remier unable to consolidate hia authority in the country. 
There is nothing new in that picture. There ie nothing in it 
which would lead me to revise the conclusions which I reached last year. 
On October 15th, I reported those conclusion• to the Committee on Foreign 
Relatione. 1 should like to re-emphasize them at thia time by reading 
pertinent •ections: 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 51, Folder 43, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 3 -
A year ago, the principal requirements for the 
success of our policy with respect to Indochina were political. 
These requirements, full independence and effective internal 
government, notably in Vietnam, have not been effectively 
fulfilled. The failure in .thia respect appears abo to have been 
accompanied by a consistent underestimating of both the political 
and military strength of the Vietminh, on the part of practically 
all concerned. In consequence, the situation bae aerioully 
deteriorated. 
The United States sharea reepon•ibility for the rever .. 
sal in Indochina. We should not make the mhtake, however, 
of assuming all the blame. We gave material aid unstintingly, 
but its value waa dissipated by inadequaciea elsewhere. I 
report this. not so much in criticism--! am fully aware of the 
great contributions to the common cause made by sincere French 
officials and sincere Vietnamese nationalists--but rather to make 
clear that thia country has discharged the commitments which it 
was asked to make last year and which it agreed to make. At 
that time it was not asked to commit and was even discouraged 
from committing manpower in Indochina. Not until the crbis 
of Dien Bien Phu did the question even arise. Then the pres-
sures of American opinion operating largely through Congress 
disco uraged a hasty, ill-conceived involvement. Our share in 
the defen•e o! Indochina was clearly understood at the outset to 
be the supply of material aid only and we quite properly insisted 
that this understanding be maintained. The situation in Indo-
china is·only one of the many crises that confront us and the 
burden of sustaining free-dom in the world must be equitably 
borne. 
At present, there appears to be. at beet, scant hope of 
achieving the objectives of our policy in Indochina in the near 
future, with Cambodia the only exception to this conclusion. The 
present Government of Vietnam which il based on the sound 
principles of national independence, an end to corruption and 
internal amelioration, ia immobilized largely by a squabbling 
plotting opposition. Its critics complain of the personality of 
the leader of that Government. In view of the numerou.s and 
varied personalities who have occupied the Preddency in Saigon 
during the past 2 or 3 years without tangible results, it aeeme 
more likely that the re'l question ia one of dt.aatiafaction with 
the principles of the Diem government rather than the inade-
quaciea of his per•onality. 
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Should the Diem government be forced out of office, it 
ia doubtful that under the pressure of time a more aatie!actory, 
substitute, subscribing to the same principles to which he does, 
will be found. Yet these principles must prevail in south 
Vietnam, if an alternative to the Communist Vi~tminh that ia 
likely to be acceptable to the people of Vietnam h to exiet. 
Any replacement of Diem at thie time, if it occurs, will 
probably take the form of a military dictatorship baeed upon 
a coalition of the special intereets, parties, and groups which 
now oppo1e the preeent Government. It ia improbable that 
the substitute will be the kind of government which will be 
generally supported by the Vietname•e people any more than 
the pre·Diem governments were. Nor is it likely to be a 
government capable of sustaining a free and independent 
Vietnam eventually without .foreign support. It was to develop 
that kind of Vietnam that the United States made available 
hundreds of millions of dollars of aid • . In my view, only that 
kind of Vietnam can achieve the purpose of our policy in 
Indochina which, in the final analysis, is its freedom and the 
coneequent enhancement of our own eecurity. 
In the event that the Diem government falls, therefore, 
I believe that the United States should contider an immediate 
sus pen•ion of all aid to Vietnam and the French Union forces 
there, except that of a humanitarian nature, preliminary to a 
complete reappraisal of our :present polieiee in Free Vietnam. 
Unless there is reasona~ble expectation of fulfilling our objec-
tives th~ continued expenditure of the resou.rces of the citiz-3ns 
of the United States ia unwarranted and inexcusable. 
Two parts of those conclusions should be underlined in connection 
with the present cris.i.t. They bear directly on it. 
1. Should the Diem government be forced out of office, it ie 
doubtful that under the pressure of time a more eatiefactory 
8\lbstitute eubecribing to the same principle• which he does, 
will be found. Yet those principles must prevail in south 
Vietnam, if an alternative tu the Communist Vietmlnh that 
is likely to be acceptable to the people of Vietnam is to exist. 
and 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 51, Folder 43, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
.. 
- 5-
Z. In the event that the Diem Government falls, I believe 
that the United States should consider an immediate Ius -
pension of all aid to Vietnam and the Fl'ench Union forces 
there, except that of a humanitarian nature, preliminary to 
a complete reappraisal of our present policies in Free 
Vietnan1. 
A r.ho :vdown in Slligon is now in progreee. I know that there 
are side issl.les in thil str\lggle. I know that it ha• been contended and 
perhap1 correctly that Diem i8 too uncompromiting in his dealings with 
other leaders. Basically, however, the 1howdown is between two set1 
of forces in Viet Nam. The one, presently personified by Diem, •tanda 
for a decent and honest government in an independent Viet Nam. Aliped 
against it are those 111ho have little concept of, little concern or down-
right contempt for what these terms mean. Diem has recently expt'eaaed 
hb intention o! holding elections ae a first 1tep towards t'epresentative 
government. ' ho opposes these elections? Thole, apparently, whose 
power is net based on the consent of the people over whom it is exercised. 
The opponents of the Diem government have power but it is a power built 
largely on corruption and th~ fear that their private armed forces inspire . 
It i• the power of the Black Hand and the witch doctor. 
If the !orces standing !or decency and hone•ty and genuine 
national independence !&it in this crisis, the cause of human freedorp in 
Asia will not gain. This co\lntry will not gain. The Frf:nch will not 
really gain. Even those Vietnamese who help to bring about the do'Wl'lfall of 
the government, in the long run. will not gain. Cnly the Communiats will gain. 
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It is possible that a. sernblance of stability m ay be prc;duced in 
Saigon if a coalition of the corrupt replaces the present government. 
Beneath the •urface, however, the penetration of communism will go 
on rapidly and inevitably. 
My view of the present crisis remains a.s 1 expressed it in the 
conclusions of the report which I read today. Current developments 1eem 
to me only to emphasize the pertinence o! those conclusions. 
If is posdble that the Executive Branch has inforrr;ation on the 
situation itl south Viet Nam going far beyond that which is currently 
ap~earing in the prets. It m ay he that General Collins' report to the 
President and the Secretary of State will add important elements to the 
present picture. It may be that in time this body will be advised of facta 
which we do not n ow have. 1t may be that the President and the Secretary 
of State will have to alter the p!"¢Sent direction of our policy away from 
8\lpport ol the Diem Government in VietNam. That is entirely possible 
and, if it is the case, it certainly lies within the:ir responsibility to make 
the neces &ary adjuatluents. However. if this government is to align ita elf 
with the kind of forces which are now in opposition to Diem, if it is to 
spend hundreds of millions of dollars in support of those forces, I believe 
the America.n people will expect a clearcut explanation. I believe they will 
expect an explanation which will •how how such exp:enditur~a contribute to 
the national intere•t• of thil country. It will be the responsibility of the 
CE)naress and especially of this body to see that they get it. 
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1 should like to append to my remakra several newapaper excerpt• 
which describe in far more graphic terms than I could hope to do the 
fantaatic nature oi the fo.rcea which ·oppoee Diem. Theae are the force• 
that are being talked of in some quarter• a• hia loaical replacement. 
This ie the base on which our aid ia auppoaed to build a atrong a nti-
communist bulwark in touth VietNam. 
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